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CASE COMMENTS
Otsuka v. Hite illustrates and follows this concept. In restricting
the state provision for disfranchisement for conviction of an infamous
crime, Otsuka recognized and applied the common law nature-of-the-
crime test rather than the punishment test which is used to protect a
fifth amendment right. Since historically the character of the crime
has been a foundation for civil right disqualification, its application
to the facts in Otsuka was appropriate. However, to define an "in-
famous crime" as one involving moral corruption and dishonesty is
not to establish satisfactory classification of the term. It is submitted
that all felonies involve an element of moral corruption. Hence there
is merit in the logic of the dissent which, in the absence of a more
satisfactory, workable standard, preferred to adhere to a reasonable
objective standard.
B. WAYNE TucKER
WAIVER OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Questions involving waiver of the privilege accorded confidential
communications between a physician and his patient have been a
frequent source of dispute. The privilege is entirely based on statute,
as it did not exist at common law.' The first statute conferring the
privilege provided that waiver could be made only in open court.
2
Since then some jurisdictions have expressly provided in the privilege
statute what acts shall constitute waiver.3 In other jurisdictions the
courts have attempted to construe the statutes so as to imply a waiver
when the reason for the privilege no longer exists.4 The case of
Mathis v. Hilderbrandi 5 represents a departure from the rules of statu-
tory construction heretofore applied to the privilege statutes.
Hilderbrand involved an action for personal injuries to a minor
child. The trial court denied defendant's motion to require plaintiff's
physician to testify on pretrial deposition. The Supreme Court of
Alaska reversed, holding that plaintiff had waived the privilegeP by
an elective office. Within the common law concept as applied by the Illinois court,
a public officer who has been convicted in a state or federal court of a felony
which involves moral turpitude contrary to commonly accepted principles of
decency and honesty has been convicted of an infamous crime. Id. at 175-76.
'Zeiner v. Zeiner, 120 Conn. 161, 179 Ad. 644, 646 (1935); Duchess of Kingston's
Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 573 (Eng. 1776).
28 VIGmoRE, EvIDENCE § 2380, at 819 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
358 Am. JuR. WITNsseFs § 443 (1948).
48 XVIcMioRE, EvIDENCE §§ 2389-90 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
5416 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1966).
6Alaska R. Civ. P. 43(h) (4) provides: "A physician or surgeon shall not,
against the objection of his patient, be examined in a civil action or proceeding
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commencement of the personal injury action. A finding of waiver be-
fore commencement of trial in the absence of a statutory provision
to that effect appears to be without precedent.7 The majority of the
court indicated that they were "convinced that a rigid enforcement
of the privilege under the facts of this case would serve no useful
purpose and might result in injustice." 8
The underlying policy of the privilege is the protection of the
patient from embarrassment or fear of disclosure. It is contended
that such a policy is more conducive to full and frank disclosure to
the physician,9 thereby promoting more complete medical assistance
for the patient.10 It is also submitted that the privilege benefits the
physician, for by full and frank disclosure he is able to make a quicker
and more accurate diagnosis.1'
The existing law of waiver of the privilege can be divided into
several distinct categories, as determined by the statute conferring the
privilege: (1) states with statutes expressly providing for waiver when
the patient testifies at trial;' 2 (2) states with statutes expressly pro-
viding for waiver by commencement of suit where the physical or
mental condition of the patient is in issue;13 (3) states with statutes
providing for waiver by order of the court; 14 (4) states with statutes
containing no provisions for waiver either upon commencement of
the personal injury action or by the patient's giving of testimony at
as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to
enable him to prescribe or act for the patient."
7See Boyd v. Wrisley, 228 F. Supp. 9, 10-11 (WD. Mich. 1964); Smart v.
Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162, 105 S.W. 709, 714-15 (1907); Kassow v. Robertson, 143
N.E.2d 926, 927 (C.P. Ohio 1957); Hague v. Massa, 80 S.D. 319, 123 N.W.2d 131,
134 (1963).
8416 P.2d at 10.
9Arizona & N.M. Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669, 677 (1915).
1OBishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 1006,
1011 (8th Cir. 1965); Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876).
"See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Nelson v. Ackermann, 249 Minn. 582, 83 N.W.2d 500, 510 (1957).
12N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12 (1953); N.D. REv. CODE ANur. S 31-01-06, § 31-01-07
(1960); OHio R~v. CODE AN. § 2317.02 (Baldwin 1965); OKLA. REv. CODE ANN.
ch. 12, § 385 (1960); ORE. REv. STAT. § 44.040 (Repl. 1963); S.D. CODE § 36.0101,
§ 36.0102 (Supp. 1960); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-139 (1959).
1MAiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 12-2236 (1956); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1881 (Deering
1959); HAWAu REv. LAws § 222-20 (1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51 § 5.1 (Smith-
Hurd 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427 (1964); MicH. STAT. ANN. S 27A.2157
(rev. 1962); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1207 (reissue 1964); NEv. REv. STAT. § 48-080
(1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 328 (Purdon 1958); WAsH. REv. CODE § 5.60.060
(1959).
'4N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. S 8-289.1 (Repl. 1957).
CASE COMMENTS
trial. " i In those states not recognizing the privilege there is no problem
of waiver since no privilege can be asserted.10 The law is quite clear
in those jurisdictions where the statutes provide for waiver, but where
the statutes do not expressly so provide, courts through judicial inter-
pretation have often reached conflicting conclusions. The privilege
favors secrecy over truth and the law on waiver in these jurisdictions
indicates the varying degrees to which the privilege is deemed to be
in the best interest of justice.
If the patient on direct examination testifies to a communication,
this is considered to amount to a waiver as to that communication.
17
However, the law is in conflict when the patient does not reveal any of
the matters discussed in the consultation, but testifies only as to his gen-
eral physical or mental condition at the time of the consultation. One
view is that "where the patient tenders to the jury the issue as to his
physical condition, it must in fairness and justice be held that he has
himself waived the obligation of secrecy .... 11 18 However, the pre-
vailing view is that the patient's testimony without disclosure of the
privileged matter does not amount to a waiver.19 If the privileged
matter is revealed on cross-examination, it is not considered a waiver of
the privilege under either view since it is not regarded as a voluntary
disclosure 20
15ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 43(h) (4) (1963); AaK. STAT. ANN. § 28-607 (Repl. 1962);
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7 (1964); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (1961); IDAo
CODE ANN. § 9-203 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2.1714 (Burns, Rep1. 1946); IOwA
CODE ANN. § 622.10 (1950); Ky. REv. STAT. § 213.200 (Baldwin 1963); LA. REv.
STAT. § 15:476 (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595-02 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1697
(recompiled 1956); Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060 (1959); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN.
§ 93-701-4 (Repl. 1964); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 4504(a) (McKinney 1963); UTAH REV.
CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6-10 (1966) (restricted to
courts not of record); Wisc. STAT. § 885-21 (1965).
'0 Zeiner v. Zeiner, 120 Conn. 161, 179 Ad. 644 (1935); Hollenbacher v. Bryant, 42
Del. 242, 30 A.2d 561 (1943); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Fla.
195, 182 So. 911 (1938); Trammell v. Atlanta Coach Co., 51 Ga. App. 705, 181
S.E. 315 (1935); Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 223 A.2d
303 (Me. 1966); O'Brien v. State, 126 Md. 270, 94 Ad. 1034 (1915) State v. Kociolek,
23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957); Caddo Grocery & Ice v. Carpenter, 285 S.W.2d
470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Mohr v. Mohr, 119 W. Va. 253, 193 SE. 121 (1937).
See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 12 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-2-5 (1956);
S.C. CoDE ANN. H§ 32-1489, 72-307 (1962); also Tennessee and Vermont where the
only statute is the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.
"'Nolan v. Glynn, 163 Iowa 146, 142 N.W. 1029 (1913).
18Hethier v. Johns, 233 N.Y. 370, 135 NE. 603 (1922). Accord, Ansnes v.
Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 133 Neb. 625, 276 N.W. 397 (1937); Capps v. Lynch,
253 N.C. 18, 116 SE.2d 137 (1960).
l9Pearson v. Butts, 224 Iowa 376, 276 N.W. 65 (1937); Harpman v. Devine, 133
Ohio St. 1, 10 N.E.2d 776 (1937); Hudson v. Blanchard, 294 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1956).
20Johnson v. Kinney, 232 Iowa 1016, 7 N.W.2d 188 (1943); see also Arizona &
1967]
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It is held in some jurisdictions that the patient waives the privilege
by calling the physician to testify as to the privileged matters.21 This
rule is also applied in jurisdictions whose statutes provide for waiver
when the patient testifies at trial.2 2 However, no waiver is implied
where the questions asked the physician are for a collateral purpose
such as to establish that he is an expert witness.23
Waiver may also be effected by contract. A stipulation in a life in-
surance policy application which is made part of the policy contract,
by which the applicant waives the privilege is valid 24 and also binding
on the beneficiary and estate of the insured.2' But such contracts are
strictly construed against the insurer who drafted them,20 and courts
will go far to obviate the effect of such contractual waiver.2 7 In one
jurisdiction such waiver has been held ineffective since the privilege
statute provided for an express waiver in court,28 and in another it
is considered against public policy.
29
N.M. Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669, 677 (1915) (dictum as to the voluntariness of the
disclosure generally).
21Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Moody, 199 Ark. 483, 134 S.W.2d 868 (1939);
McDonnell v. Monteith, 59 N.D. 750, 231 N.W. 854 (1930). For statutory recogni-
tion of this principle see MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2157 (1962). It has been held
error for the judge to grant an instruction that a prejudicial inference may be
drawn from the failure to call the physician. Sherman v. Ross, 99 Colo. 354, 62
P.2d 1151 (1936). Contra, Gulf Ref. Co. v. Myrick, 220 Miss. 429, 71 So. 2d 217
(1954).22McDonneU v. Monteith, 59 N.D. 750, 231 N.W. 854, 859 (1930); Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry. v. Hughes, 64 Okla. 74, 166 Pac. 411, 412-13 (1917).
23Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 108 Utah 577, 162 P.2d 759, 764 (1945).24New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Torben-
sen v. Family Life Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 401, 329 P.2d 596 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958); Trull v. Modem Woodmen of America, 12 Idaho 318, 85 Pac. 1081 (1906)
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N.E. 176 (1927).
25Adreveno v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 34 Fed. 870 (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1888); Torbensen v. Family Life Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 401, 329 P.2d 596
(Dist. Ct. App. 1958); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 116 Ohio St. 693, 158
N.E. 176 (1927).
26Turner v. Redwood Mut. Life Ass'n, 13 Cal. App. 2d 573, 57 P.2d 222 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1936).
27Campbell v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 31 Ohio L. Abs. 420, 34 N.E.2d 268
(Ct. App. 1940) (insurer failed to attach the application containing waiver to the
policy; held not an effective waiver).
28Holden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 N.Y. 13, 58 N.E. 771 (1900). The
New York statute as amended in 1963 removed the requirement that waiver must
be expressed at trial. The statute no longer states what specific acts will constitute
waiver. N.Y. Civ. Prac. S 4504(a) (McKinney 1963). The implication of the
change is that such contractual waivers are now permitted since the former
provision was deliberately designed to invalidate contractual waivers.
29Miller v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 F. Supp. 365 (W.D. Mich. 1953),
citing Wohlfeil v. Bankers Life Co., 296 Mich. 310, 296 N. V. 269, 273 (1941): The
CASE COMMENTS
Although the privilege is usually beneficial to the physician it may
also pose a dilemma. In Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,30 a phy-
sician believing himself to be faced with an imminent malpractice suit
disclosed certain privileged communications to the attorney for de-
fendant insurance company. The court held the disclosure made the
physician liable for breach of a trust.3 1 The dilemma thus facing the
physician is at what point in time may he consult an attorney in
preparation for an imminent suit and not incur liability for disclosure
if the suit is not brought. Some courts recognizing the confidential re-
lationship between physician and patient hold that the physician's dis-
closure prior to the filing of the briefs will make him liable for an
invasion of privacy.3 2 None of the statutes recognizing the privilege
have provided for this contingency.
Hilderbrand in finding waiver before commencement of trial relied
on cases implying a waiver at trial without statutory authority.33 The
treatment of the privilege in suits against physicians for malpractice
provides some authority in support of Hilderbrand3 4 In Kriger v. Hol-
land Furnace Co.,3 r a personal injury action, plaintiff asserted the
privilege to prohibit disclosure of information in a pretrial examination
of her physicians. The court agreed that the statute protected the
plaintiff in the assertion of an "absolute privilege," 36 but it did not
"give her the right to . . . require the court to proceed with the
trial of her action as long as she is unwilling to permit pretrial inquiry
physician-patient privilege "cannot be changed or frittered away in the manner
attempted in this case." Cf. Creech v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 211 N.C. 658,
191 S.E. 840, 842 (1937).
30243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
311d. at 803.
321d. at 800, distinguishing an earlier case, Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181
A.2d 345 (1962), on the ground that New Jersey had no public policy recognizing
a confidential relationship. Cf. Van Allen v. Gordon, 83 Hun 379, 31 N.Y. Supp.
907 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
33Mauro v. Tracy, 152 Colo. 106, 380 P.2d 570 (1963), and McUne v. Fuqua,
42 Wash. 2d 65, 253 P.2d 632 (1953), held that the patient had waived the privilege
by testifying to his injuries and treatment. These cases are distinguishable from
Hilderbrand in that the respective courts found the waiver at trial and not on
commencement of the action.
34Awtry v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (a malpractice action
in which the court permitted pretrial discovery). It has long been established
that the patient waives the privilege by testifying in a malpractice suit. Becknell
v. Hosier, 10 Ind. App. 5, 37 N.E. 580 (1894); Hartley v. Calbreath, 127 Mo. App.
559, 106 S.W. 570 (1908).
3512 App. Div. 2d 44, 208 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1960) (holding was made pursuant to
Civil Practice Act requiring certification of completion of all pretrial discovery
before a case is docketed for trial).
361d. at 288
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with respect to the injuries for which she seeks to recover damages." 
3 7
As long as the plaintiff "insists on asserting that right she might not also
insist that her case must be advanced for trial, when it is quite evident
that such a course of action ... will necessarily do injustice to other
litigants." 38 Thus the plaintiff could assert the privilege before trial, but
as long as she did, there would never be a trial. In Hilderbrand the
court implies a waiver and in Kriger it permits assertion of the privilege
but at the expense of trial. The result in fact is the same, the only
distinction being one of semantics. Moreover, the back-door approach
taken in Kriger is not to be applauded, for no "absolute privilege" is
conferred by statute when the court refuses to enforce it.
Hilderbrand is consistent with the modern view of judicial proced-
ure. With today's emphasis on pretrial conferences and settlements it
is requisite that all material facts and issues be presented before trial.
If the court had not compelled the disclosure, it would have been
necessary to grant a continuance at the trial when the plaintiff offered
evidence as to his physical condition. Such a result would be contrary
to a policy of encouraging pretrial discovery.
At least one noted authority anticipated the Hilderbrand result, sug-
gesting that it would be justified under any statute which does not
provide for consent or waiver.39 However, courts have reached the
opposite conclusion by reasoning that the statutory privilege is indica-
tive of legislative intent that such consultations be inviolate. There-
fore, the statute was broadly construed in favor of the patient, and
any act constituting waiver had to be set forth in the statute itself.40
Hilderbrand is in accord with the better practice of not blindly adher-
ing to the quantitative majority but of adopting reasoned rules of law
followed by progressive jurisdictions. The principle of waiver upon
commencement of a personal injury action is recognized by statute in
ten states4' and has been adopted by the Model Code of Evidence42
and the Colorado Bar Association. 43 Nebraska has amended its statute
to expressly deem the privilege waived upon commencement of a
personal injury action instead of when the patient offers evidence of






McCoRmIICK, EVIDENCE § 108 at 220-21 (1954).
401n re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 743 (SD.N.Y. 1944); Nelson v.
Ackermann, 249 Minn. 582, 83 N.W.2d 500 (1957).
41Supra note 13.
4 2Rule 223 S 3 (1942).
4312 Colo. Bar Ass'n Newsletter 8 (1965).
44NEB. REv. STAr. § 125-1207 (reissue 1964).
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The principle of waiver upon commencement of the action seems
to be supported by reason if not by judicial decision. There is little
value in preserving a privilege designed to conceal truth when the
patient himself has lifted the veil of secrecy. There is little value in
postponing waiver until trial if waiver is bound to result.
The existing law should have sufficient flexibility so that the exercise
of the privilege will not foster injustice and deceit. The most effective
statutory provision would be one similar to the Virginia statute.45
This statute recognizes the privilege but expressly provides for waiver
when the physical or mental condition of the patient is in issue.
46
Flexibility is achieved by an added provision which permits the trial
judge to compel disclosure in other instances in the interest of the
proper administration of justice.
A statute making the invocation of the privilege discretionary with
the trial judge in all other instances would be a better alternative to the
law presently existing in most states. A practical and pragmatic deter-
mination could be made depending upon the facts and circumstances
of each individual case. Such a statute would not bind the hands of
the trial court; it would place the responsibility with the tribunal
which is in the best position to assess the genuineness and merit of the
claim, and the value of particular and specific evidence in a given
suit. This may well have been in the minds of the majority of the
court in Hilderbrand by their express application of waiver to the
facts of the case. By so doing they have enlarged the meaning of the
existing statute, while not announcing a hard rule of waiver, antici-
pating that circumstances in a later case might dictate a contrary
result. Whether or not this was a factor in the court's determination,
Hilderbrand represents a much needed departure from the existing
law and is probably a barometer of a developing trend.
STEwART RoGER FINDER
45VA. CODE: ANN. § 8-289.1 (Repl. 1957). "[Plrovided however, that when
the physical or mental condition of the patient is at issue in such action, suit or
proceeding or when a judge of a court of record, in the exercise of sound dis-
cretion, deems such disclosure necessary, disclosure may be required. . .
46DeFoe v. Duhl, 286 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1961).
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